Connector security and review
Request the narrowest local authority, prove it under supervision, and keep native code independent from package publication.
Native connector code is not portable package code. Passing package conformance does not approve a connector, and approving a connector does not approve every package that accepts its observations.
Zero-grant default
The sidecar begins with no arbitrary network, filesystem, process, credential, account, Station-store, OBS, or package authority. Declare every capability in the authoring brief and test behavior without it.
Examples of narrow reviewed grants:
- connect to one configured private-LAN host and port;
- read one user-selected file tree with constrained extensions;
- communicate with one supervised local socket;
- store connector-local opaque state in a bounded host-provided location.
Review questions
- Can the same outcome be achieved with less authority?
- Is source configuration bounded and validated?
- Are credentials held by Station rather than exposed to package code?
- Does revocation close every resource promptly?
- Can deterministic fixtures reproduce translation and failure behavior?
- Are observations narrow, semantic, versioned, and size bounded?
- Are logs and diagnostics safe to retain and share?
- Does the connector avoid anti-cheat-sensitive memory reading or injection?
Supported APIs, files, logs, replays, save files, official plugins, and explicitly reviewed capture-based recognition are preferred. Direct memory reading, injection, or anti-cheat-sensitive access is never the default launch plan.
Publication status
The current public tooling prepares Linux x86-64 or Apple Silicon macOS connector evidence for private review. Windows and Intel macOS are unsupported authoring hosts. Open community signing, broad platform distribution, and arbitrary native capability approval remain gated. Document the limitation honestly in the Library listing.